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W RmNG ea 391, the historian Ammianus Marcellinus has left us a vivid description of the Roman defense of Constantinople against the Goths shortly after their 
crushing_defeat by these Goths at Adrianopolis on 9 August 378 
(31.16.4tf): 
Unde Constantinop_olim, copiarum cumulis inhiantes tlmplis-
simis, formas quatlr4torum 4gmimum insidwrum metu ser-
fJtlntes, ire ocius festitwb.mt, multa in exitium urbis inclita.e 
molituri. Quos inferentes sese immodice, obicesque portllrum 
p"ene puls~&ntes, hoc r:ASU c.eleste reppulit numen. S4r~&cen­
orum cuneus (super quorum origine moribusque diversis in 
locis rettulimus plura). ad fun4 mtlgis expeditionalium re-
rum, quam 4d concurs4torias habilis pugnas, recens illuc 
accersitus, congressurus b~&rbtlrorum globo repente con-
specto, a civitate ftdenter erupit, diuque extento certamine 
pertinaci, 4equis partes discessere momentis. Sed orientalis 
tumw noflo neque tlnte viso superavit eventu. Ex ea enim 
crinitus quidam, nudus omnill praeter pubem, subraucum et 
lugubre strepens, educto pugione, agmini se media Goth-
orum inseruit, et interfecti hostis iugulo labr~& admovit, 
e!fusumque cruorem exsuxit. Quo monstroso miraculo bar-
flari territi, postea non ferocientes · ex more, cum 4gendNm 
appeterent 4/iquid, sed ambiguis gressibus incedebant.1 
1 
•from t~re [Perintbw] they [the GothsJ basrened io rapid march to Con-
stantinople. greedy for its vast heaps of treasure. marching in square forma-
tiooa for fear of ambusades. and ioteodiog to make mighty effortJ to destroy 
the famous dry. But whik they were rmdly rushing on and almost knocking 
at the barrien of the ga.tes, the celestial power checked them by the following 
event. A troop of SaracellS (of whose origin and cwtoms I have spoken at 
length in various places), who are more adapted to stealthy raiding expeditions 
than to pitched battles, and lwf recently been rummoned to the city, desiring 
to acw:k the horde of bubarians of which they bad su.ddeoly caught sight, 
rushed forth boldly from the city to attack them. The contest wu long and 
obninate. and both sides separated on equal terms. But the Oriental troop 
ba4 the advantage from a strange event, never witnessed before. For one 
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That Saracen troops played a key role in the defense of Con-
stan~nople in 378 is amply attested. Writing at the beginnin~ of 
the stxth century, Zosimus also described their success agatnst 
the Goths, or Scythians, as he called them (4.22.1ff Paschoud): 
'0 SA PacnA£u~ OUw.:n~ lnl;o..,tvo~ ii&t Ti}v 8p~K'Ilv nooav 
'tOu~ .t!CU9a; Oecblltvot;, lyv{l) 'toU~ be -rile; ecPac; crl>v au'tlp 
n«p«JEVoJ.livou~ mt JUX;tt<J9u1. JA.I!0' 'inK(I)V btelpO'tU'tOUS 1'fi 
'tcUV .tl0)9cUv \nxtp np6'tt'pov btuti)Ll(lal. AaP6V'tet; o{)v ou'tol. 
1UXpcX 'toU PacnAiC!Xi 'tO <J'6v6t,Jla m't' o)..{you~ ex: 'tcUv 't'il<i Kow-
c:rtaV't\VOUKOAt~ IWAcUv iae~iJeaav, KUl 'tOUt; iddKOV'tU'j 
m9&v 'to\<; KOV'tO~ K£poV0»V't~ KOAA&v iu4.£~ h:Ua'tl\~ 
lcpepov Keq>aMc;. btei Sf: ft 'tO>v 'iuow -taxu'tit~ Kai ft 'tB>v mv-
'tO>v hncpopa Maj.lazoc; t:tVa1. 'tO~ .t.rueau; rooK£1., mmcrtpa-
Tilri\G«l 'to IapaK'IlVlKOv ~hevoi)91laav q~ulov • £ve6pav nva 
KOLAo~ ivanoKpU'Ifav"t£<; 'tOKol.<; 'tp£~ £vi Ix:UO~ bnivat auv-
ewov IapcxK'IlVcP. Ka\ "taU't'll<; 6£ 61.CXJlap'toV"t£c; 'ti\c; uipw;, wv 
IupaK'Ilvmv Sui 'tO 't&v c:sq~edp{l)v \nn{l)v 'taxU Kat ei>aycayov 
~'t' i;ouGUxv WtoqlroyOV't{I)V, i}v{m l)' Uv KAii~ £2nov WoiZV, 
£7tcAaUVOV't{I)V S£ oxoA.a\otc; Kai 'tO~ ICOV'tO~ civatpoUV't{I)V. 
:00~~ i:yiveto .EICUO&v cp<)voc; O>crte cbaoyopt'OOav't~ aU'toi>t; 
i6el'llaa1. nepauo&ilva1. 'tOV "IG'tpov ~~.:al. aq~ac; i~~.:Souva1. 'tO~ 
OUvvo~ ~ov T\ uao ~vciv 21CXVCDAt9pi~ 61.Ucp0ap'ijvat • 
m'taALamow 6£ cxU'tO>v 'to~ aepi. K(I)VCJ'tav"ttvou -rlJv .OA.Lv 
-c6Jrouc; Kat 1t0p pCO'tip{l) npoeA.Oovt(I)V. movev EUP\ll{I)Pia 't& 
Paal.A.Ei Kapayaye'iv £~ 'tO KpOC:SCil m G'tptl't£U~ 2 • 
of ?teir number, a ~ wi~ lon.g hair and naked except for a loin-cloth. ut-
tcnng hoarse and dumal cnes, wnh drawn dagger rushed into the thick of the 
Gothic army, and after kil.l.iog a man arplied his lips to the throat and sucked 
the blood that poured out. The barbanaos, tecrified by this strange and mon-
ltrous sight, a.fter that did not show their usual sclf-confideoce when they at-
tempted any action, but advanced with hestitating steps• (ten and tr.: Rolfe, 
LCL). 
z •The emperor V alens, seeing the Scythians plundering all Tbrace, decided 
to send against the ScythiAn cavalry fint the Sancena he had brought with 
him from the East, who w~e exp~n cavalry mm- At the emeero~s order, they 
left t~e gates of .Comtanunople 111 small groups, and impaling the straggling 
S~s on .theu lam:es. brought baa the beads of many each day. Since the 
speed of thetr horses and the impact of tb£ir lances were difficult for the 
Scytbians to withstand, they decldccl to c:ounteru:t the Sacacco.t by stratagem. 
and set ~p an ambush in some hollows, outnumbering the Saracens three to 
one. Thla plan wu thwarted, however, because the Saraans, owing to the 
speed and ~D.~.Dqcability of dlcir borsea, ac:aped whenever they saw a group 
of ScytlUans approaching. but whenever the Suacens caught the Scythjans un-
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Zosimus very closely follows his late fourth-century source, 
Eunapius (fr. 4 Block1ey), and sets th~ Sarace?s• d~ense of C.on-
stantinople before the battle of Adnanopohs. ~1s contrad1c~ 
Ammianus, who sets their defense of Constanunople after th~s 
battle. So when did it occur? It is generally accepted that Arruni-
anus and Zosimus describe the same engagement, but th~t one 
of them has misplaced it within his narrative, and Amm1anus' 
account is usually preferred to that of. Zosimus.~ Shahid has ar-
gued, however, that they really descnbe two. dtfferent en~ge­
mcncs, i.e .• two Saracen defenses of Constanunoplc_. one before 
the batde of Adrian.opolis, the second after, b":t hts arguments 
are unconvincing and occur in a work otherwtse marred by, a 
determination to discover references to Saracens where none m 
fact exist.4 His interpretation of the evidence is disconcerting 
not least because it requires that Ammianus and Zosimus are 
both mistaken, that each has omitted one of the two alleged de-
fenses of Constantinople, rather than that ~ne al?ne errs. 
Further no ancient source actually sup{orts h1s thes1s of two 
Saracen' defenses. Consequently, a brie response to his argu-
~ they killed them with their lam:es and there wu such slaughter tha.t 
they gave up a.nd wanted to croP the Danube and submit to the Huns rather 
than be utterly destroyed by the Saracens. ~ben. they left the ~ea around 
Constantinople, the emperor had room to brang hU army forwa.rd (tr. R. T. 
llidley, Zosimus, Nev1 History [=Byz.,tiru .Austr•limfiA 2 (CAnberra 1982)] 
79(). . • 
, E.g. N. H. Baynes, M. Manitius, in CMH I (1924) 235, 252; A. Ptgaruol, 
L'Empire chritim (J2J-J9J) (Paris 1947) 168{; H. Wolfram. History of the 
Goths, tr. T. J. Dunlap (Berkeley 1988) 129; P. HEATHEll, Goths .nd Rom.ms 
JJl-489 (Oxford 1 991: hereafter 'Heather') 1 42 n.52. 
• I. SHAlilD, Byz411tilun .,d th~ Arabs in the Fourth C~~tu'? (Wu~ng1on 
1984: hereafter 'Shahid') 179f. For an example of his determmatton to cliscover 
references to Saracem that will enhance their political :and military sig~i­
ficance at this period, see his treatment of the role of th~ San.cens, dur~n.g 
Julian's Persian expedition in 363, esp. 107-10. Ma.ny of btS alleged ~plic1t 
references to Saracena in Ammianus refer in fact to two Roman wuts, the 
una.rii and the M4ttU.m, on which see D. Woods, •The Role of t.be Comes 
Lucillianus during Julian's Penian E:ar:peditioo,• .AntCl67 (forthcorrung, 1998). 
S. T. Parker Rom~ms and S~tr•cens: A History of the Ar•bwn Frontier 
(Winona Lake 1 986) 14-4, and T. S. Burns, Barbari.ns within the G4tes of 
Rome: A Study of Ronwn Mili~ Policy .nd the B•rh~trilans ea J7J-42J AD 
(Bloomiogton 1 994) 28£, 34, seem also to accept two San.cen defenses of 
Constantinople although they do not explain their arguments. If I seem to 
sinde out siiahid for disagreement, ~ is because his is by far the ~· com-
prehensive account of ~~ ~elevant tss~es, a.nd he always makes his assump-
tiom or arguments explic1t m a refreshingly honest and open way. 
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ments is not out of place. Why should we believe Zosimus that 
a Saracen defense of Constantinople took place before the batde 
of Ad.rianopolis? 
Shahid claims first that •he [Zosimus] wrote in Constantinople 
not long after these events had taken place, and thus he was in a 
privileged position to ascertain such details as affected the deliv-
erance of the city in which he lived.• Although it is probably 
true that Zosimus did wrire.;in Constantinople, fie did so ea 498-
520.5 Some confusion is evident here between Zosimus and his 
main source Eunapiw. The exact date of Eunapius' History, and 
whether it was published in stages rather than as one complete 
work, is a matter of some controversy, 6 but what is not contro-
versial is that Ammianw and Eunapius were contemporaries, 
and that neither's work can be preferred to the other's simply 
on the basis of date. To what extent, if any, Eunapius travelled 
outside his home city of Sardis in Lydia after his return there in 
369 remains unknown/ Relatively little is also known about 
Ammianus" travels after his retirement from the army at his 
home city of Antioch in 363, although he did reach Rome by ea 
383.' So neither author had particularly strong ties with Constan-
tinople, although both may have visited the city. In brief, 
neither Zosimus nor, more properly, his source Eunapius merit 
a •privileged position• over Ammianus. 
Shahld's second argument completely misses the point. He 
claims that "Zosimw' account contains topographical and chron-
ological indications that leave no doubt that he knowingly 
assigned it [the Saracen defense of Constantinople] to the first 
phase of the Gothic War,• i.e., before the battle of Adrianopolis. 
Yet the real question is not whether Zosimus •knowingly• did 
this, but whether he was correct. Indeed, as Zosimus for the 
most part merely abbreviated Eunapius' work, there is little 
question of his deliberately, or "knowingly, • assigning anything 
anywhere. He simply followed the order of his one main 
source at this particular point in his narrative. Again, in his 
fourth argument Shahid claims that "a close examination of the 
accounts of the two engagements reveals that in spite of super-
5 SeeR. T. Ridley, •ZoJimus the Historian, • BZ 65 (1972) 277-302at 27&fL 
' See A. Baker, •Eunapius' Nta "E1COOcniJ and Pboaus: GRBS 29 (1988) 
.) 89---402. 
7 See R. Goulet, •sur la cbronologie de la vie et des a:uvres d'Euaape de 
Sardet, • ]HS 100 (1980) 60-72. 
1 SeeJ. Matthew~, The Rom.n Empire of Ammianus (London 1989) 8--17. 
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ficial similarities involving Gothic and Saracen horsemen fight-
ing not far from Constantinople, they are quite distinct from 
each other. • Here he emphasizes the difference between Zosi-
mus, who claims that the Goths wanted to retreat across the 
Danube in the face of the Saracen attack, and Ammianus, who 
claims that the Goths were eventually driven back across the 
Balkans to the foothills of the J ulian Alps (31.16.7). Yet Zosimus' 
claim-a rhetorical statement to emphasize Gothic fear of the 
Saracens-is not to be taken Hterally, and if Zosimw does not 
understand this himself, then he has misinterpreted Eunapius.' 
The Goths were never driven beyond the Danube. Indeed, it is 
important to note that Zosimus states not that the Goths 
actually retreated across the Danube, but that they merely 
wanted tO do this, so that his account is perfecdy reconcilable 
with Arnmianw' in this detail at least. 
I have left Shahid's third argument until last because it repre-
sents a clear rejection of the interpretation that I shall advocate 
in this paper. He rejects as •the most improbable of courses• 
any suggestion that •instead of hurling the Arab against the 
Gothic horse, he [Valens] locked up the Arab foederati, horse-
men adapted to mobile warfare, within the walls of Constan-
tinople, where they remained inactive, to be exhibited only after 
the campaign was over, in the aftermath of the battle of Adrian-
ople, ana fight in an engagement such as the one Ammianus de-
scribes. • But such an interpretation remains improbable only if 
one assumes that the Saracens were Valens• only, or most highly 
reputed, cavalry when he returned to Constantinople in the 
spring of 378, and that they were the natural choice to repulse 
any Gothic raiders in the vicinity of the city. Yet Valens must 
have been accompanied by the bulk of his palatine forces at 
least, including_ two types of cavalry units, the scholae palatinae 
and the fJexillationes palatinae, not to mention those mobile 
units ranking as comitatensis rather than palatina. So he did not 
neceuarily need to use his Saracen cavalry in the manner 
anumed, as they were not his only horsemen •adapted to 
mobile warfare. • Nor can we easily assume that large numbers 
o£ Goths really threatened Constantinople before the arrival of 
Valcns, as Zosimus would have us believe-a subject to which I 
shall retUrn shordy. 
The truth is that neither Ammianus' nor Zosimus' accounts of 
the CYents leading up to, and after, the battle of Adrianopolis are 
' F. a IS of Zo•imus' geograpbic:al errors, see .Rid.ley (fHpr• n.S) 296f. 
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entirely satisfactory. Fortunately, we do not have to rely on 
their. testimony alone. Although the so-called Consu.L.ria Con-
suntinopolitana does not mention the Saracens, this imROrtant 
source for events 356-384, written at Constantinople from a 
Constantinopolitan point of view,10 confirms that the Goths did 
reach the gates of Constantinople only after the battle of Adrian-
opolis. So full is its account of the momentous events of 378-
Valens• arrival at Constarltinople from the East on 30 May, his 
departure on 11 June, a great battle between the Goths and 
Romans on 9 August at the twdfth milestone from Adrian-
opolis-that it is difficult to believe that its compiler omitted a 
Goth-Saracen engagement of the size that Eunapius and Zosi-
mus describe. So the earliest and most trustworthy source 
tends to support the testimony of Ammianus rather than that of 
Eunapius an<l Zosimus: the Goths reached Constantinople only 
once and after the batde of Adrianopolis. 
The mid-fifth-century ecclesciastical historians Socrates (HE 
5.1) and Sozomen (HE 7.1) also provide important information. 
Both describe how Saracens contributed to the defense of Con-
stantinople, although Socrates' is the original account that 
Sozomen merely paraphrases (Soc. HE 5.1): 
To\>~ ~w~ Oual.a!Vw~ /Wrtlov iOX'}KMO~ -rl}v -r~v. 
oi ~lkxPo" mA.lv £~ 'tOw -tetxeov 'tile; Kc.ovmrxvnvoua6A.£~ 
EA86vTte; 'tU 1tt:pl a-imlv brop9ouv ltpoOm£\D.. 'E•' ot~ o 31\~ 
UyuvtlK'tCOV Bt. eau'tCOV 't'O~ ~a.p~&.poua uvtmel;ft£CJCXV. eKUO"-
'tOS -ro arxpawrx&.vov cXv'ti OaMru A.a~pcivovt~ 'Eae&u Si 'to~ 
e~wUCJ\V £i<; wv KOM~V it 'tOU ~ClCJWO)S 'Y'>vft AOJ.LVlK(l ~1.09ov 
eK 'tOU f3aoli..tKOU taf.lELOU, m9a m\ 'tO~ CJ'tpa'tlCl)tO.J.Ca £v.:v6~-
1CJ't0. 'Ene:JJ<ni9ouv 8£ ai>w~ o~i'}'Ot Icxpa1Cf1vot \nroCJKOVBo1, mtpu 
Mau·~ UJLCP9M£~. ft~ ml cXv(i)tEP(I) iJLVTI~VEUCJrxjl£V. Tou-tov 
oov -rov tp6xov -ntVlKa;\im 'toU &;~ou liy<lJvtCJrxJ,Livou, ?Wppm 't'ii~ 
mAt:~ chtexoop1lCJCXV oi p&.p~pot.•1 
10 SeeR. W. Burgess, The Chronick of HydMU.s .nd the ConsuwriA Con-
suntinopolit4114 (Oxford 1993} 1~98. 
11 
• After tbe Emperor Valens bad thw lost ha life. in a manner which has 
never been sa.tisfactorily ascenained, the barbarians again approached the very 
walls of Cooswninople. and laid wa.su the suburbs on every side of it. Where-
at the people becoming indignant armed themselves with whatever weapons 
they could severally lay their hands on, and sallied forth of their own accord 
against the enemy. The empress Dominica cawcd the same pay to be dis-
tributed out of the imperial treasury to sucb as volunteered to go out on this 
servjg:. as was usually allowed to soldiers. A few Saracens also assisted the citi-
zen~, being confederuea, who bad been sent by Mavia their queen; the lauer 
we h:ave alreadv mentioned. In this way the people baving fought at this time, 
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SocrateS supports Ammianus' descrietion of events: only one 
Saracen defense of Constantinople aHer the battle of Adrian-
opolis. He is all the more trustworthy not only because he 
wrote at Constantinople,12 but also because he clearly had access 
to a detailed Constantinopolitan account of events in and about 
the city at that time. Earlier he had provided an exact date for 
the arrival of Valens in Constantinople, 30 May, an exact date for 
his departure, 11 June, and much else besides (HE 4.38): 
b 6£ ~aoll.ti>c; OUW..T\c; aept 'tfJv -tptam&t wu Mc:ilou f.I.T\Vlx;, f:v 
'tft £tctn eau'tcru uaau~ Kat OUaA.ev-ttvuxvo& 'toU viou ro &U-
n:pov, WMw e~ -riJy Kmvc:mxvttvoUlEOAtV rop!aKet <tOv 8;ULov f:v 
ci9uJLi~ Ka9£Cftcir'trx ooU.fi. 0\ -rciP ~&.p~po&. Ka.mBpu~ovuc; 
TfJV 8p= nBT\ x:ai 'tU KpOcXa't£1.0. ilt6p6ouv 't'ii~ KmvO'tCXV-
't\VOUHO • J.LT\B£~t&; oilcnt~ Ul;10,uixou 't1\YtKaUm 6uvcXfJ.e~. 
'EKe\ 6£ m\ 'toi~ 'ttlX&CJl •po<Jlldcil;~tv bqeipouv oi pcip-
~cxpot, xaA.&lECOc; it KO~l~ ltp£p£ 'tU ')'lVOJ.lfVO.· £,n9UplCov 't£ 
tta'trt -to& ~ClCJWCDc;, ~ i7ta.1tl-r6v-toc; -toi>c; no~iouc;, Ka.L O'tl 
~it cXv'tE1t£l;i\'YtV £V8l»~. ciUcl na.peil1C£ 'tOY npo~ 'toU~ IJap-
~pouc; K6MJ.Wv. KalSft \uoopo~UxA; bnuA.ou~£v-qc;, xcivtec; iK 
CJUllCPOlV~ KIX't£~ wU pac:nM~ cbc; 1l£plop6>V'tO<; m KpUl-
J.Ul'trx' tKp«l;ov ouv crov'tOvCDc;, 00s <*la x:ailEOM~oU~t:V it~e~. 
Trxl'ml ~cnV'tQJV. E~ttK'te:tat npOc; opyitv b ~aowuc;. Ka.i UKep-
pa{v&\ K£pi 'tfJv £v6ooi111v 'tOU 'louv{ou ~1}v0c;. tnCXK£~fJCJ~ i\v 
imoo'tpe~, 6\KT\v cixO K(l)vCJ'tuvnvouxoA.tt&v A.itvea9a.l, &v 
'tO'te bppi~etv rx-inbv WOICOUV, K(ll U.ep &v nBT\ KpO"ttpov 'tft 
wpcxvvfASt fipoK<miou npoo£8tv't6· EP1\~ 't£ ~emacmtO£\V 'tfJv 
1lOl.tv, Ka.l apO'tpOV £Ut0w ~aMiV Ka't ' UUTfJV, tni. 'tOUc; J}ap· 
~pou~ qfilptt. Kat cOaet JLho ainoo7. x6pp(l) 'tile; noA.e~· £6\(I)K£ 
8£ cXXPl 'ti\c; £v 8pt1C[1 'ASpuxvouxoA.~. ;; £v 'tOt~ op{otc; 't'f\c; 
MaKE&vCac; tCJ'tiv. l 
the barbarians retired to a great distance from the cir:y" (tr. A. C. Zenos, in 
Socrllles, Sozot~tn~us Cbtmb Historks [ =NicPost-NicF Sec. 2 2 (New York 
1890)] 117f; Greek text: R. Hussey (Oxford 1853] 567ff). 
12 See T. Urbainczyk, Socrllles of Consuntinop/e: Hist~n of Ch11rch •nJ 
Sr.te (Ann Arbor 1997) 13-39. 
n •ne Emperor Valens arrived at Corutantinople on the JOtla of May, in 
the sixth ye.v of bi.s own consulate. and the second of Valentinian tbe 
Younger. and found the people in a very dejected state of mind: for the bar-
barians, who had alceady desolated Tbtace, were now laying waste the very 
suburbs of Constantinople. there being no adequau force at hand to resist 
them. But when they undertook to make near approaches, even to the walls 
of the city, the people became excecdi.agly troubled, and began to murmur 
api.ast the emperor; accusing bim of having brought on the enemy thither, 
and that i.odoleotly prolonging the struggle there, instead of at oru:e marching 
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The precise nature of the chronological information quoted-
the consuls of the year, the dates of Valens• arrival in and depar-
ture from Constantinople--sufnce to prove that Socrates had 
access to an authoritative source like the Consularia Constantin-
opolitana. The real question is whether he combined this with 
another source, i.e., whether his information concerning_ the 
public disturbance in the Hippodrome, for example, came from 
the same authoritative solfrce as this chronological detaiJ.t4 Next, 
how did he use his source or sources? His account of the distur-
bance in the Hippodrome is probably trustworthy in that it 
seems to be the same incident that Ammianus described as a 
minor outbreak of popular discontent (31.11.1). His testimony 
fleshes out this incident in more detail-important because thts 
detail may help explain why Eunapius, followed by Zosimus, 
wrongly dated the Saracen defense of Constantinople before 
the battle of Adrianopolis. In fact, there were two popular dis-
turbances at Constantinople, the first during Valens• stay there 
when he ignored the inhabitants' pleas to arm them, the second 
after Valens' death when the empress Dominica acceded to 
their fresh pleas for arms, even paying them as regular soldiers. 
So one explanation for Eunapius' mistake about the Saracen 
defense is that he has dated it by one of the popular disturban-
ces there, but wrongly attributed it to the occasion of the first 
disturbance. This interpretation, however, has Socrates describe 
out against the barbarians. Moreover at the exhibition of the sports of the 
Hippodrome, all wich one voice damored against the emperor's negligence of 
the public affain, crying out with great earnestness, 'Give us arms and we our-
selvea will fight'. The eTror, provoked at these seditious clamors, marched 
out of the city on the 11 of June; threatening that if he returned. he would 
punish the citizens not only for their insolent reproaches, but for having 
previously favored the pretensions of the usurper Procopiw; declaring also 
that he would utterly demolish their city, and cause the plough to pass over its 
ruins, he a.dvanc:ed against the barbarians, whom be routed with great 
alaugbtcr, and putSUed as far as Adrianople, a city of Thrace, situated on the 
frontiers of Macedonia'" (tr. Zenos). 
14 Socrates provides direct quotations relevant to events in the Hippodrome 
on two other occasions (HE 7.22, 23). AJ similar material does not occur in the 
Consal.m. Comllmlirwpo/iwu, one su.pects that be may have had another 
source specificaUy for evenu in the Hippodrome. It may not be irrelevant to 
his knowledge of, and interest in. the history of the Hippodrome that the 
judicial records of the eastern praetorian prefect had been stored there since 
the reign of Valens: see. in genCtal, C. M. Kelly, •Later Roman Rureaucracy: 
Gains through the Files, • in A. K. BOWDWl and G. Wool£, edd., LiurM-"1 and 
PMHr in the Ancient World (Cambridge 1994) 161-76. 
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the disturbance in the Hippodrome as a reaction to the Goths' 
success in reaching the walls of Constantinople, and would 
seem to lend some weight to the claim of Eunapius and 
Zosimus that the Saracens had had to clear Gothic raiders from 
the environs of Constantinople even before the battle of Adrian-
op.olis. So what do we make of Socrates' evidence in this 
matter? What was the real cause of the first public disturbance, 
if not the unexpected appearance of Gothic raiders at the gates 
of Constantinople? 
One could argue that one or two raiders may have slipped 
past the Roman pickets on the main approach roads at this time, 
reached the suburbs and panicked the population almost exactly 
as alleged, and that Socrates, or rather his source, has exagger-
ated tlieir number. On an alternative argument, there may have 
been no Gothic raiders at all. Even an empty rumor of such 
would have sufficed to panic the urban mob. Perhaps some 
individual Goths still serving in Roman forces at an outpost near 
the city misled passers-by into thinking that they had witnessed 
hostile Goths, scouts or some larger force. ts A more radical rein-
terpretation of the evidence, however, may be required. 
Why accept that the Goths, or the rumor of such, had any-
thing at all to do with the disturbance in the Hippodrome? 
Clearly Socrates• account is not without errors. His claim that 
Valens, while leaving, threatened to demolish Constantinople is 
completely ridiculous-an absurd piece of propaganda that prob-
ably originated in a group opposed to the emperor's Arian 
policies. Nevertheless, Socrates appears to have accepted it at 
face value. His /·udgement may have failed him in other details 
also. In particu ar, there is a strong ~ossibility that he has in-
ferred tlie cause of the disturbance m the Hippodrome from 
the alleged words of the crowd and general political circum-
stances, rather than that his source specifically reported that 
Gothic raiders were the cause of it all. A recent work has rightly 
drawn attention to the ironic nature of the population's protest, 
"'Give us arms and we ourselves will fight .• 1' There was hardly a 
need to arm the people, for the emperor was present with his 
palatine and other forces. The people were simply protesting 
15 The magister Julius had probably not yet carried out his purge of Gotbs 
from the remaining eastern forcet, but the very fact of this purge suffices to 
indicate the anti-Gothic panic that seized the East following the disaster at 
Adrianopolis (Amm. 31.16.8; Zos. 4.26). 
"See A. CAMUON, J. LoNG, and L. Smau, &Jrbt~rians •nd Politics Ill the 
Co11rt of Arc.dias {Berlteley 1993: hereafter •cameron et .J. ') 209 n.55. 
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the emperor,s lack of action, and not necessarily because they 
felt under any immediate threat from the Goths. One sus~ects 
rather that they were annoyed at the continued demands of the 
soldiers who were billeted upon them, and at the shortages in 
and about Consta.ntinopleY So they perceived the Roman 
forces, not the Goths, as an immediate threat to their physical 
and financial well-being; their taunts to do the fighting if 
necessary aimed to emba.rass the emperor into removing his 
forces-and their demands--as far from their city and as soon as 
possible. Little did they know that they would have a real 
reason to demand arms just over a month later. Socrates, how-
ever, wrote with the benefit of hindsight and in the knowledge 
that Goths really did threaten the city after Adrianopolis; this 
led him to interpret an ironic demand for arms literally and to 
infer Gothic raiders. 
Although the importance of Socrates' testimony lies primarily 
in discerning the date of the Saracen defense of Constantinople, 
it is also significant because he specifically identifies the origin 
of these Saracens: they had been sent to Constantinople by their 
queen, Mavia. Sozomen provides the best account of Mavia"s 
dealings with the Roman Empire, to be supplemented by other 
ecclesiastical historians.11 Following the death of her husband, 
Mavia had led the Saracens in a revolt against the Empire, and 
had even forced the magister t:quitum et pt:ditum per Orit:n-
tt:m, one Julius apparently, to retreat from a battle that might 
have ended in a complete rout for the Romans. had not the dux 
Phot:nices disobeyed orders and used his archers to cover his 
superior's retreat. It is difficult to date this war. but it seems 
lik:ely that it ended not long before Valens set out from Syrian 
Antioch for Constantinople, i.e., in 377 probably. The war was 
finally settled by negotiation. The terms of the final settlement 
do not survive, but Mavia and her followers seem to have done 
quite well, as the Arian Valens was forced to accept the ordina-
tion of the orthodox monk Moses as the bishop for Mavia and 
17 An ordinary citizen had to surrender a third of hU howe for the use of 
billeted troo_ps. half of his howe to more senior ofti<:ers, and although there 
was no lep.t obligation to do so, it was customary for soldiers to demand 
bedding, food, and fuel from their reluctant host: Cod. Theod. 7.8.1- 16, 9.1-4. 
11 Soz. HE 6.38; Theod. HE 4-.20; Soc. HE -4.36; Ruf. HE 11.6; the basic 
study is G. W. Bowersock, •Mavia, Queen of the Saracens: in W. Eck., H. 
GalSterer, a.nd H. Wolff, edd., St•tlien z•r Antileen Sozi•lgeschichte: 
Festschrift Fmtlrich Vittinghoff (Cologne 1980) 4-n-96 (=Bowersock, Strulies 
i11 rhe E~Utnll ROWWII Empire [Goldbach 1994] 127-40). 
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her followers, and the magister equitum in praesenti Victor 
accepted a daughter of Mavia as his wife. 
Thls brings us to the Saracen defenders of Constantinople, 
usually described as foedt:rati, and there seems no reason to 
doubt that they served Rome as a result of the final settlement 
or treaty (foedHs) between Valens and Mavia. But foederati, an 
extremdy vague term, indicates neither the status nor the organ-
ization of Rome's new Saracen allies. n How many' Saracen 
recruits were there? Were they dispersed throughout different 
units or concentrated in one only? Were these units newly 
created for this purpose or had they existed earlier? What was 
the status of these units? Or did these recruits form a group of 
irregulars. not expected to conform to standard Roman organiza-
tion or discipline, not part of the army proper, but merely a tem-
porary support rather than a permanent force? 
An obvious starting point for any investigation of this matter 
must be Ammianus' description of these Saracens in the de-
fense of Constantinople. He refers to them as both a Saract:n-
orum cuneus and an Orientalis turma. Although Ammianus was 
a former soldier and his work is an important source for 
military historians, he wrote within a dassicizing tradition that 
discouraged the use of technical vocabulary, military or other-
wise.20 Thus he often avoids precise 'modern' terms in his 
description of military units in favor of vaguer classical terms 
like cuneus and turma here. Although cunt:us could be a tech-
nical term for a particular type of Late Roman unit, 21 the word 
has a long historyZ2 and Ammianus uses it in an entirely non-
19 H. Eltoo, W•rf•re in Rcmum E11ropt! AD JJ0-42J (Oxford 1996) 91£, 
righdy emphasizes the difficulty in interpreting a.ny panicular we of the term 
foetkrati. Nevertheless, be proceeds (93) to include these Saracens in his table 
of the •[oetkr.U regiments in the Roman army,• as Lf one could easily assume 
that all. or even most, foetkrati were constituted into separate units distinct 
from regular Roman forc:ea. Alternatively, these Saracens are sometimes 
referred to as auxiliaries: see e.g. N. Lenski. "The Gothic Civil War and the 
Date of the Gothic Conversion, • GRBS 36 (1995) St-87 at 65 n.36. This is no 
less f[UStrating a description of these troops than foeder•ti, bec&use it often re-
mains unclear whether it is being used technically to denote membership of 
u lfl4xiliMm pal.tinJUn, as an synonym for foetkr•ti, or in a mistaken belief 
that their position was similar to that of the auxiliary forces of the principate. 
20 See A. D. and A. M. Carneron, "Christianity and Tradition in the 
Historiography of the Late Empire,• CQ 58 {1964) 316-28, esp. 326. 
21 E.g. Not. Dig. Or. 39.12-18, 40.11- 17, 41.12-19, 42.13-21; Oc. 32.22-27, 
33.24-28, 34.14-f. 
21 See lL Grosse, Riimische MiliUrgeschichte {Berlin 1920) 5 tff. 
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technical sense-best seen in its use for barbarian forces, i.e., 
forces hostile to Rome and unaffected by Roman organization 
or discipline: Frankish raiders in Gaul {17 .2.1), for example, or 
Sarmatians and Quadi along the Danube (17.12.1), !saurian brig-
ands {19.13.1}, Persian uoops in the East {24.5.1}, as well as 
Roman forces (17.12.9; 20.11.6). Likewise turma, which Ammi-
anus does not hestitate to apply to both Persian forces (24.6.8; 
29.1.3) and Roman (16.~1.6; 18.8.2). Hence it is entirely wrong to 
assume that these terms in reference to Saracens prove anycliing 
concerning their organization or status, except that turma 
confirms that they are cavalry rather than infantry.23 
One reason modern commentators are so unwilling to admit 
that the Saracens were recruited into the Roman army proper, 
ie., within existing Roman units alongside recruits of other 
ethnic or cultural backgrounds, Roman and non-Roman alike, 
must be Ammianus• horror story of the Saracen who drank a 
fallen Goth's blood. Not only was this a bizarre deed, but Am-
mianus' description of the Saracen as naked except for a loin-
cloth does not match expectations of a soldier•s dress, what-
ever his background, in any regular Roman unit. But Ammi-
anus' account of the event is inaccurate and biased. His de-
scription of the Saracen is merely an ethnic stereotype, also seen 
in Jerome's similar description of Saracen raiders who captured 
a certain Malchus and his party on the road from Beroea to 
Edessa (Vita Makhi 4). Indeed, Ammianus' whole account of 
the Saracen defense of Constantinople has been distorted by his 
strong prejudice against Saracens (Shahid 239-68)-best revealed 
by conuasting his account of the Saracen defense of Constan-
tinople with that by Zosimus: Ammianus emphasizes that the 
Goths and Saracens were evenly matched in battle until that 
suange deed when a Saracen drank the blood of a Goth; Zosi-
mus depicts the Saracens as clear superiors to the Goths from 
their first encounter, which forced the Goths to change their 
tactics in the false hope that this might turn the tide of battle in 
their favor. So Ammianus credits the Saracen victory to the fact 
that they were more barbarian even than the barbarian Goths; 
Zosimus credit5 their victory to their speed and maneuver-
ability, i.e., their skill in battle. Ammianus' horror story may 
21 Sbahid (e.g. 177, 179, 253 n.48, 5)5) places undue emphasis on Ammi-
anus• terms, which he inte.rprets as if they were technical military terms, i.e., as 
if cuneus could only be used to refer to a particular wedgNhaped formation 
unique to the Romans and turma only to refer to a subdivision of an Ilia or 
other cavalry uniL 
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even have a basis in fact, but he has put the worst possible 
interpretaion on the evide!lce: ~osimus specifically rec?rds that 
the Saracens beheaded the1r vtcnms, so that ·Ammtanus account 
of the Saracen drinking blood from his victim•s throat may b.e 
no more than a distortion of a Saracen's attempt to behead hts 
victim.24 Whatever the case, Ammianus•.;dislike of Saracen~ also 
appears mu~h earlier whe'! he descr1bes ~hem ~ des1rable 
neither as fnends nor enemtes, and summanzes the1r customs 
in an inaccurate, unflattering manner (14.4.1-7). ~hethe~ Am-
mianus' attitude towards Saracens resulted from hts expenences 
during Julian•s Persian ex;pedicion in. 363, when many Saracens 
had aligned themselves w1th the Pers1ans (25.1.3, 6.8ff), or from 
his general military experience in the East, he w~ und?ubtedly 
prejudiced against them. n So when we seek to mvestlgate the 
status of the Saracen defenders of Constantinople _in 378, we 
must be wary of any prejudice co'!cerning ~eir mihwy worth 
unwittingly absorbed t!u'ou~h read!ng ~mnuanus. . 
It is important at ~s pomt to 1nqutre about.the htstory of 
Saracen involvement m the Roman army durmg the fourth 
century in the hope that this might she~ ~ome light ?pon ~e 
nature of their contribution to die Emptre s defense, m 378 m 
particular. The Notitia Dig_nit;ztu"! attests a number of S~ac~'! 
units among the eastern limztanez ~a 394. The. com~s !zmztu 
Aegypti had a unit of equites Saracem Thamudem ~t h1s dispo.sal 
(Or. 28.17), while the dux Phoenices had two umts of equztes 
Saraceni(Or. 32.27f). A Saracen contribution, however, to .the 
mobile forces under the immediate command of a magzster 
militum, i.e .• among the pak.tini or comitatenses, is not atte~ted. 
Given the Saracen defense of Constantinople after Adnan-
opolis, ?ne ~ight. exp~ct inclus!~n of ti:teir unit, !ike. others 
formed m thas penod, m the Nott.tta Dt.gmutum On_e~tu co~­
posed ea 394. The T ervingi and Visi, for example, auxilia pak.fU!a 
of the two eastern '!'agistri militum p~a:sental;s in the N~ut~a,, 
derived from Gothtc groups who paructpated m Theodosaus I s 
z• See A. K. Goldswonby, The Roman Army at War 100 BC-AD ~00 
(Oxford 1996) 271-75, for an account of headhun•~ by Roman ~orce! ~unng 
an earlier period, although with too m~h empbasa on the Celuc ongm and 
nature of this practice. As Caesar. Julian seems to have encouraged head~ 
bWlting againJt German raiders c" )56 (Zos. ~.7.1-S). . . 
Z5 Given Ammianus' origin at or near Ant1och. some of his !nends or r~la­
tives may have suffered at the bands of the Saracens~ parucularly .durme 
Mavia's raids c• 377. See D. Woods, •Maurus, MaVla., and Amm.tanus, 
Mnemosyne, fonbcoming. 
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382 settlement with the Goths (Not. Dig. Or. 5.61, 6.61; 
Heather 162£). Indeed, many units whose positions in the 
Notili4 reveal their formation about the time of the Gothic war 
376-382 retained their ethnic titles.26 So if Valens had raised a 
unit of Saracens for his mobile forces during his Gothic war, 
then the Notitia might attest such a unit. But its absence 
provides good reason to doubt that the defenders of Constan-
tinople had formed a completely new unit rather than being 
assigned to one or more pre-existing units. 
The alternative suggesuon, of course, is that the defenders of 
Constantinople were limitanei, temporarily assigned to the 
mobile forces for the duration of the Gothic emergency, who 
returned to their relevant station in the East after the settlement 
of 382. This remains possible, although Saracens had never been 
called upon in this way earlier (so far as known), not even 
during Constantius Il's campaigns against western rivals. One 
suspects that the Saracens were recognized as specialist desert 
warriors whose expertise would have been wasted in the very 
different terrain of continental Europe, and that they were the 
last troops upon whom any emperor would have called as 
reinforcements for a western theater of operations, given that 
some troops had always to be left in the East because of the 
continued Persian threat. This is not to ignore that eastern 
peoples and units had been regularly transferred throughout the 
empire during earlier centuries, 27 but the new distinction 
between comitatenses and limitanei meant that those in a 
position to do so would inevitably try to negotiate service in 
one branch rather than the other. Given their position on the 
borderlands between the Roman and Persian empires, the 
wastelands where neither empire exercised complete control, 
no people were in a better ~osition to do this than the Saracens. 
The reluctance to leave the1r native lands for prolonged service 
overseas, which played so large a part in encouraging his Gallic 
troops to hail Julian as Augustus in early 360, was hardly unique 
to tliese troops.21 Of particular rdevance is Julian's objection to 
Constantius II's demand to send more of his troops eastwards: 
26 Not. Dig. Or. 5.58ff (RA.ctobuii, Angle'fl.rii, Hiberi}, 6.58ff ( BMdnob.ntes, 
FJchm11:ru, Thr.ces). 
'll E.g. cohors I mi/Ji.ri. HetMsmorJmJ at lnten:isa in Pannonia, cohors I 
H.mioJ'IIm ugimuioJ'IIm at Carvoran in Britain. 
21 Amm. 20.4.10, 16, 8.8. Note also the large number of deaenions from units 
that the co~ms do~msticorwm Richameres transferred from Gaul to Thrace in 
3n (Amm. 31.7.4). 
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many of them were trans-Rhenane volunteers who had been 
promised that they would never be transferred beyond the 
Alps (Amm. 20.4.4}. There seems no reason why many 
Saracens should not have been able to extract similar promises. 
So it is no surprise that the only known Saracen contribution to 
a mobile Roman force was durmg Julian's Persian expedition in 
363, when Julian passed through the very territories they ruled 
and Roman limitanei also were called upon for support. 1' 
Finally, one should not forget that Socrates specifically states 
that the Saracen defenders of Constantinople were few in 
number, so few that they had to be reinforced by arming some 
civilians. This is all very vague, but it does provide grounds for 
bdieving that the Saracens may· have formed only part of a 
cavalry unit rather than a full unit. 
From another perspective, which troops would V alens most 
likely have left to garrison his capital, in part at least, after he set 
out against the Goths with the main body of his uoops? The 
scholae palatinae~ the units of the imperial bodyguard, spring to 
mind immediately.30 They had a long association with the east-
ern capital. At least two units had been entitled to receive an-
nona mica at Constantinople since the time of Constantine 1,31 
and Constantine's extended presence there during his last years 
suggests that barracks should have been arranged to accomo-
date some scholarii from this early date. Many scholarii must 
have been accomodated within the city-walls, for the schoue 
palatinae certainly played a key role in defending their capital 
(and their emperor) from the rebel Goth Gainas in 400 (Cam-
eron d aL 207-17). The evidence is scanty, and there can be no 
absolute proof that Constantinople had a permanent garrison of 
scholarii, or that scholarii remained there in the absence of the 
emperor. But Valens had already had his fingers burned earlier: 
the usurper Procopius had been declared emperor in Constan-
29 See Amm. 23.3.8, 5.1; 24.1.10; 25.6.10. On the role of limilfJnt~i note the 
presence on the expedition of the dux OsrhomM Secuodinus (Amm. 24.1.2) 
and the legio 1 .A~ (Malalas ll.2J ). · 
30 The Notiti. of c• 394 lists seven schoiM under the command of the east· 
em m.gister offidor.m (Or. 11.4-10), but their number varied between five CA 
J64 and eight ea 420: see my •ne ScholM P.J.tinM and the Notiti. Digni~ 
tMMm, • }RomMilitEq.UpSt 7 (1996) fonhcoming. 
lt Cod. Th~otl. 1-4.17.9 (26 July 389): .Annon.s cifJic.s in Mrb~ Constantin-
opo/it~UU tchol.e scut.Tiorum t!t SCIIuriorJmJ clib.nllrimMm tlivi Const.nlini 
Mlsmmtur J;berAiiute meTNis~. possibly referring to three scholae with this 
privilege: schol. sCIICMioJ'IIm pr;nu. and se01ntl. (Not. Dig. Or. 1 1.4t), as well 
as schol. scut.rionun clibii1JIIrionun (11.8). 
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tinople on 28 September 365 when he had won over two pala-
tine legions, the Di'fJitenses Iuniores and the Tungricani luni-
oresJ which had happened to be in the capital for two days 
during their journey from Asia to the Danube frontier (Amm. 
26.6.12-18). Procopius' success-he met no armed resistance-
suggests the absence of a permanent unit of scholarii in the city 
at that time. But his success may also have convinced Valens of 
the need for such a garrilon in the future. Whatever the case, it 
is somewhat misleading to focus on the ~rson of the emperor 
in this instance, to the neglect of others of the imperial family. 
Socrates• testimony reveals that the empress Dominica, Valens' 
wife, was present during the Saracen dcfense of Constantinople. 
Presumably her husband had left her there for her own safety 
when he had finally set out against the Goths. It is not an unrea-
sonable assumption that her escort included scholarii for both 
her personal protection and that of her entourage. 32 And as 
none of the varied sources for the Saracen defense of Constan-
tinople describes the separate participation of scbolari~ an ob-
vious inference is that these Saracens were scholarii and 
members of Dominica's escort. 
So why not identify the Saracen defenders of Constantinople 
as scholarii? After all, they were, like the scholarii, cavalry. Per-
haps modem commentators have shied away from this identi-
fication-apart from Ammianus' prejudiced description of the 
Saracens-because Germanic or Gothic iniluences on the late 
Roman army have received too much emphasis.'' Yet the evi-
dence for recruitment into the scholae in particular should not 
be anachronistically applied, such as the facile assumption that 
the ethnic or cultural mix in the scholae remained constant 
throughout the fourth century, or was the same in both halves 
of the Empire. Much of the most colorful and often-quoted 
evidence in this matter pertains to the period 382-402, after the 
Gothic settlement of 382 until shortly after Gainas' revolt in 400, 
'
2 That empcuses reuincd milituy escoru is genera.Uy agreed: ~.g. K. G. 
Holum, TheoJosi.n Empresses (Berkeley 1982) 25£; see also Jul. Ep. tUi Ath. 
285b; Soc. HE 5.1 1; Theod. HE 5.18. 
n E.g. R. I. Frank, Scholt.e P•i.lin~U: The P.J.ct G~U~rds of th~ L..ter 
Rorrum EmpiJY (=PAAR 23 [Rome 1969]) 59, claims that·~ the founh 
centuty moat of the schowres were Germans, and this wu especWly true of 
the enlisted men•-a widely repeated view (e.g. R. MacMullea. Corr11ption 
t~~~Jd the Decline of Rome (New Haven 1988] 201), although challenged 
,.,.,.,.nl'lv hv Rlton (n~Drt~ n.19} 151£. 
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when Gothic or German influence in the East peaked.,. Yet the 
situation that had confronted Valens througliout most of his 
reign had been very different. Since the division of the Empire 
between himself and his brother Valentinian in 364, he had been 
cut off from the manpower resources of the Rhine and upper 
Danube regions. On the lower Danube he had been in continu-
ous conflict with his Gothic neighbors from his accession in 364 
until the treaty of 369, which then had weakened Gothic obliga-
tions towards their Roman neighbor. So Valens was increas-
ingly forced to turn towards his eastern borderlands for fresh 
troops for all branches of service. His situtation foreshadowed 
that of the fifth century, when Armenians and Isaurians pre-
dominated in the armed forces to such an extent that it was later 
claimed {Procop. Anecd. 24.15ff) that the scholae palatinae had 
consisted entirely of Armenians by the reign of Zeno (474-491). 
In this instance, Valens' recruitment of Saracens to the scholae 
palatinae should be compared to his recruitment of Iberians to 
the same branch of service. The tribune of the scbola scutari-
orMm sagittariorMm at Adrianopolis was an Iberian prince Ba-
curius (Arnm. 31.12.16). Later evidence suggests a special associ-
ation between the ruling dynasty of Iberia and this unit, prob-
ably created as recently as ea 370 to provide honorahle service 
for the hostages Valens had detained following his settlement of 
the Iberian crisis in that year.15 Valens' treaty with Mavia and her 
Saracens may have stipulated similar conditions such as the sur-
render of certain nobles, among others, for service in the 
scholae palatina~~ hostages in fact. 
I argue, therefore, that the Saracens who defended Constan-
tinople in 378 were scholarii. probably members of the empress 
Dominica's escort. They had remained in Constantinople from 
30 May, the date of Valens' arrival with his wife. This ts not to 
claim that Dominica's escort consisted solei y of Saracens, 
merely that they were the part of her escort designated to sally 
forth ~ainst the Gothic raiders who approached the city. In 
describmg the defense of Constantinople, Ammianus states that 
the Saracens had only recently been summoned there (recens 
illuc accersitus }-an extremely vague statement, which does not 
relate who had summoned them, nor whence and when they 
'
4 The writings of Synesius of Cyrene have proven ve~ influential, especiaUy 
~ ngno 12; in general tee P. Heather, •Tbe Anti-Scythlan Tu;ade of Synesius' 
De Regno, • Pboeni% 42 {1988) 152-72. 
u See D. Woods, •subarmachiw, Bacurius, and the Schow Scuurior11m 
S.gilt:4rionma, • CP 91 (1996} 365-71. 
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had been summoned." Most importantly, however, Arnmianus 
does not claim that they were the only forces summoned. 
Hence I believe that Arnmianus refers here, in a rather casual 
fashion, to the fact that the Saracens were members of Valens"s 
train when he arrived in Constantinople on 30 May, after he was 
himself summoned to his capital not only by his senior officials, 
military and civilian alike, out also by the very urgency of the 
situation. No other int~pretation fits the political circumstances 
and the relevant time scale. The Goths reached Constantinople 
only days after the battle of Adrianopolis, so the authorities had 
insufficient time to send for reinforcements and for reinfor-
cements, unless at scattered outposts within the immediate 
vicinity, to reach the city. But why would Valens have left such 
forces to his rear when he marched against enemies whose great 
strength lay in their sheer numbers? Nor does it convince that 
Mavia had originally sent her Saracens to join the main body of 
Roman forces under Valens, but that they had arrived too late 
for the battle. 37 This suggests Valens• lack of org_anization or a 
measure of freedom on Mavia•s part, neither of which seems 
plausible given the length of time that Valens had tarried at 
Antioch and his determination there to settle affairs in the East 
before returning to deal with the Goths. 
Shahid prefers another interpretation: the Saracens defenders 
of Constantinople were survivors from the battle of Adrian-
opolis.31 Yet it is difficult to understand why other survivors 
should not have made it back to Constantinople, not just the 
14 Shahid (181 n.152) emphasizes Ammianw' recens to desaibe the arrival 
of the Sanc:ens at Constantinople. as if it were best suited for an event during 
a preceding period of days only-thus supponing his theory that the Saracens 
had returned to Constantinople in the few days between the baule of Adrian-
opolis and the Gothic attack on Constantinoj>le. Ammianus, however, also 
usea rec~ns for two cavalry units swwnoned from IUyricwn to Mesopotamia 
c,. 359 (18.8.2: .a subsidium Mewpot~UniM rec:em ex lllyrico missi)-a journey 
of several weeks at best. So be does not use recens in as limited a manner as 
Sbabid requires. 
JT See A. H. M. ]ones, Th~ l..Mer Rtmwn Empire 284-002 (Oxford 1964) 154; 
M. P. Speide~ •The Ro.ltWl Army in Arabia, • ANRW 11.8 (Berlin 1977) 727. 
31 Sbahid 18lff, who even claims (182 n.l5S) that the participation of the 
rn.~gisur Victor in the batde •could also argue for the participation of the 
Saracens, now his in-laws, • 11.00 that V1Ctor •is not likely to b11.ve left them 
[the Saracens] behind to per!onn garrison duty in Constantinople; rather he 
would have taken them along with him to engage in field operations and 
active combat. • But if there was such a close association between V1etor and 
the Saracem, why did Victor tlee towards Macedonia and the West (Zoa. 
4.24.3l while the Saraceos ended UP in Constantinople? 
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Saracens. Where were these other survivors? Not only might 
one expect Ammianus to mention survi~ors from Adrian~J:?ol!s 
contributing to the defense of Constanonople, but Dommtca s 
need to arm civilians for the city's defense raises further sus-
picions concerning this interpretation. After all, even a frac?on 
of the third of the Roman army alleged to have survived 
Adrianopolis should have sufficed to defend Constantin.ople 
without recourse to so desperate a measure. 39 But the survivors 
of Adrianopolis made for the nearest walled strong points, like 
the town of Adrianopolis, and were then left in the. . rea~ ?f the 
main Gothic forces who, unable to storm walls and unw1lhng to 
mount long sieges, decided to maintain their march towa~ds 
Constantinople. The Goths no doubt hoped not only f~r nch 
pickings along the way, but also to surprise a poorly garnsoned 
city long unaccustomed to defending herself. The Roman 
forces left in their wake then used the opportunity provided by 
the Goths' advance to retreat westwards, in hope of linking up 
with Gratian's forces, whose imminent arrival had been prom-
ised even before the battle of Adrianopolis (Amm. 31.16.2; Zos. 
4.24.3.). 
A final point concerns the identity of the schola of these Sara-
cens. If we assume six scholae palati~e in the East ea 378,40 then 
Zosimus, evidence on the speed and maneuverability of the 
Saracens' horses rules out the schola scutariorum clibanariorum, 
and his view that they fought with lances combines with Arn-
mianus on Bacurius• command of the schola scutariorum sagit-
tariorum at Adrianopoli~ .to eliminate their membership in ~is 
unit. Indeed, the probab1hty that the volunteers whom Domm-
ica raised were archers reinforces this point. 41 So the Saracens 
J9 Amm. 31.13.18. The estimates of survivors vuy: Heather (147) and Burns 
(supr" o.-4: 31ff) say S,OOQ--8,000. 
40 Although the Notiti• lists se':en eastern schol# ea )94 (~r. 11:~10~ I 
follow D. Hoffmann, D-s spiitriimuche Bewcgungsh~er und t/;e No~UII D•g-
Jiiutum (OiisseJdorf 1969} 284, in interpreting the schola genrilium seniorum 
(Or. 11.6} as a late transfer from West to East. 
"The s,.giturii Dominici (NoL Dig. Or. 6.56) seem to have been named 
after Dominica. so one assumes that it was formed of the volunteers raised for 
the defeose of Constantinople. This is the only occurrence of Dominici in the 
Notitit~-an argument against its interpretation as an adjective (•of the 
Lord•), as occasionally in inscriptions: see e.g. M. P. Speide~ "Maxentiw' Prae-
torians," MEFRA 100 (1988) 183-86. AlthoUgh naming a ~t after an e~ress 
was unwual, so were the circumstances: there was no obvaous alternative (or 
objection) during the interregnum between Valens' death and Theodotiw l's 
accession on 19 January )79. 
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belong to one, at least, of the scbola scutariorum prima or 
secunda. the schola armaturarum iuniorum, and the schola gen-
tiliMm iuniorum. 42 Unfortunately, this is as far as present evi-
dence on the movements and activities of the eastern scbolae at 
this period permit us to go.43 
In conclusion, the Saracen defenders of Constantinople in 378 
chanced to be there simply because they belonged to the em-
press Dominica's escort. They were not bloodthirsty savages 
only recently assembled as a temporary, anonymous unit of 
foederati to light the Goths, but members of the elite scholae 
palatinae. The absence of a Saracen known to have risen through 
the ranks to magister militum or another senior post during the 
subsequent .Period proves not so much that the Saracens had 
not been pnvileged with membership of this elite, but that the 
changing tides of political fortune had turned against them. 
Their lack of advancement up the military hierarchy was surely 
due, in part at least, to the increased competition for rank and 
privilege from the Gothic noblcs who poured into the system 
after the Gothic settlement of 382. Nor can the breakdown ea 
383. of the treaty, which had seen their acceptance within the 
scholae only a few years earlier, have contributed much to their 
further promotion or continued presence within this elite, al-
though to what extent the increased Gothic competition for I 
42 Note that Nevitta. tribune of the scho/4 •mwtur.n~m, probably com- I 
manded the escort of Eusebia. Julian's wife, during her trip to her husband's 
court in early )60: see D. Woods, • Ammiaous and Some TribHni ScholArMm 
P.l.tinarum, CQ 47 (1997) 269-91 at 287. 
41 Recently, M P. Spcide~ •Sebastian's Strike Force at Adrianople, • K/i.o 78 
(1996) 4J4-J7, has ~ed that shortly before the battle of Adrianopolis the 
schol.e were each divided between Valens and his general Sebastianus so that 
the latter received a litde over half of their total number. Unfortunately, this 
argument rests on a number of misconceptions, not least of which as that 
Eunapiw' od.t'liCl\ for Sebastianus' men (fi. 44.5 Blockley) is a translation of 
sCNtarii (436 o.S). Again, although the precedents quoted {436 n.7) do prove 
that senior military commanders did sometimes lead schoL.e in the field. there 
is no evidence that these were d.euchmeou of schol.u rather than complete 
units. In other words, the detachnK!nts composing Sebastianus' force cannot 
have been fragments of schot.e. Most importantly, it is uguable that Ammi-
anus and Zosimus, or a common sou.rce perhaps, have each misunderstood a 
description of Sebasti.anus' career, which began with his promotion by Valens 
at Constantinople in early June 378, but proceeded then to describe the 
achievcmenu that led to his promotion., ao that they have misdated Scbasti-
anus' victories over the Goths to the period after his ar. rival at Valens' coun 
rather than before. In brie~ it is arguable that Sebastianw received his strike-
force from Gratian, not Valens: see D. Woods, •The Role of Sebastianw 
against the Goths in 378, • forthcoming. 
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rank and privilege was a factor in the breakdown of this treaty is 
an interesting question. •• So ended an experiment, which, if 
allowed to continue, might have Romanized and Christianized 
the Saracen elite at an early date and have had a significant 
impact upon subsequent developments between Byzantium 
and her eastern neighbors. 
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF l!iW.AND, MAYNOOTH 
J.Jy,1997 
44 The breakd.own of the treaty is attested only by P~~n. L.t. 2 (12).22.3. I 
t~nd to agree wtth Shahid (203-21), who CJ{'lains thia event in l.erJllS of w 
nvalry between Goths and Saracens, although he exaggerates the significance 
of the religious difference• between • Arian Goths• and •good orthodox 
Saracens.• 
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